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Modern commodity price risk management 
and collateralized finance instruments
Counterparty and price risks have always been a part of
commodity production, processing and trade.  Instruments to
manage these risks were developed centuries ago in the form
of forward contracts, trade associations, etc.  However, in the
past 20 years or so, the range and sophistication of such
instruments has grown rapidly.  In the price risk management
area, the possibilities offered by commodity exchanges have
improved, and there has been a rapid increase in the role of
banks and other financial firms.  In commodity finance, new
techniques have been developed to mitigate counterparty risk,
in particular through innovative uses of commodity
transaction flows as security for financing transactions. As
the value of the commodities thus used depends partly on
prices, price risk management is usually a part of these new
financing techniques.
The main potential disadvantage of these instruments is that
they are complex and can be used badly or even for fraudulent
purposes - which can result in costly losses and even
bankruptcies.  Well publicized cases such as that of Barings
can instill a fear of these modern financial markets among
those with little experience in using them.  Among the
instruments offered, some require considerable management
time, while others are quite easy and straightforward to use.
For the first type of  instruments, guidelines on how good
control systems can be built up are available.  
The various instruments and their advantages and
disadvantages are discussed in detail in UNCTAD , “A
survey of commodity risk management instruments”,
UNCTAD/COM/15/Rev.2, March 1998; UNCTAD,
“Collateralized commodity financing, with special reference
to the use of warehouse receipts”, UNCTAD/COM/84/Rev.1,
March 1998; and UNCTAD, “The role of collateralized
finance in funding the commodity sector”, UNCTAD/ITCD/
COM/14, March 1998.  For a discussion of control systems
and on how to develop a risk management strategy, see
UNCTAD , “Company controls and management structures -
the basic requirements for a sound use of market-based risk
management instruments”, UNCTAD/ITCD/COM/ Misc.1,
1996.
INTRODUCTION
1. In 1995, commodities still accounted for 64 per cent of the exports of Latin America and the
Caribbean, 74 per cent of the exports of Africa, and 39 per cent of the exports of the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe.  Asia is the only region where most countries have successfully diversified away from
commodities (whose share in total exports is now 23  per cent), but even here, some groups of countries
(the Pacific Island States, oil exporters) remain highly commodity-dependent.  Commodities are also
important in the imports of most countries.
2. Thus, it should come as no surprise
that adverse prices, or adverse trading
conditions, can have a major impact on most
commodity-dependent countries.
Commodity markets are unfortunately not
stable, and the lack of success of past efforts
to stabilize them makes it likely that they
will remain so in the near future.  Modern
market-based financial instruments, such as
futures, options, swaps and various forms of
collateralized finance (see box 1), may not
be the ideal solution to the problems caused
by market instability, but no better
alternatives are currently available. 
3. The great advantages of these
instruments are twofold. Firstly, they can be
used to improve the risk profile of an entity,
making it less exposed to  negative price
developments.  In other words, their use
improves the predictability of future costs
and/or earnings (those who carry the burden
of commodity price risk while good price
risk management instruments exist are, in
effect, speculating).  The second advantage
(which partly derives from the first one) is
that they reduce default risk: lenders can
feel more secure in providing finance, and
thus will be willing to provide more funds
on better terms.  These advantages apply at
least in theory to any entity (though in
practice the use of the instruments may be
difficult for many entities), whether it is the
central government, a parastatal, a
commodity firm, or a farmer.   The
disadvantages are that proper use needs to
be learned, some transaction costs will be
incurred, and, as far as managing risks is
concerned, there is generally a trade-off: one
can indeed reduce the losses which would
result from negative price developments, but this advantage is often partly offset by the loss of some of the
possibilities with regard to benefiting from price improvements.TD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
page 3
  Jean-Francois Casanova, "How to implement a risk management approach in African publi c
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organizations", in UNCTAD, Proceedings of the Second African Oil Trade Conference (UNCTAD/ITCD/COM/
MISC.14), United Nations, New York/Geneva, 1997.
4. Modern market-based commodity trading instruments, such as price risk management tools and
various sophisticated financing techniques, are not panaceas; in particular, they will not help much in
stabilizing world commodity markets - they just help entities to cope better with unstable markets.
However,  they can serve more modest goals, such as securing budgets, improving cash flow management,
improving access to credit or reducing credit costs. 
5. This paper examines the usefulness and effectiveness of these instruments for mitigating risks
and reducing transaction costs for important groups of actors - enterprises (irrespective of whether they are
privately or publicly owned), farmers and Governments.  It should be noted that, with the liberalization of
commodity markets, competition has increased.  Actors now need to make full use of the array of
marketing instruments available to them in order to cope with increasing market pressures.  The withdrawal
of Governments from the marketing and pricing of commodities has also exposed new groups of actors to
previously unknown price risks and difficulties in accessing credit markets.  The practical issues with
which these often small actors are confronted when they wish to use these instruments are examined in
some detail throughout the paper.
Chapter I
THE USEFULNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MODERN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
FOR ENTERPRISES - PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT AND COLLATERALIZED FINANCE
A. Experiences
6. International commodity markets are becoming increasingly competitive, putting greater pressure
on commodity exporters.  The use of modern financial markets can be instrumental in enabling exporters
to remain competitive: it allows them to be more flexible, enables them to take more risks, and helps them
to keep costs low.  
7. If enterprises can use price risk management markets,  they can improve their functioning in
various ways;  contrary to what is thought at times, risk management is not a zero-sum game.  Research
by KPMG (one of the major international audit firms) among its clients showed an average profit increase
of 55 per cent after the adoption of a risk management programme - 20 per cent of this due to better
margins and higher volumes of business with existing clients, 15 per cent to better asset-liability
management, and 10 per cent to new products and/or clients.
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8. These increases in profit are possible because:
(a) Managers can concentrate on strategic issues rather than having to worry about day-to-
day price movements (though it should be noted that, if they opt for complex, labour-intensive
risk management strategies, they do need to devote time to proper supervision of the
implementation of these strategies);
(b) Marketing and pricing policies can be improved;
(c) Cashflow management is much more efficient;
(d) Funds for profitable new ventures are more easily available, partly because the credit
rating of the firm improves.
9. The use of collateral to facilitate financing directly reduces counterparty risk, including inTD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
page 4
  See also J. Coulter and A.W. Shepherd, "Inventory credit: an ap proach to developing agricultural markets",
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Food and Agricultural Organization/Natural Resources Institute, FAO Agricultural Services Bulletin 120, 1995.
Box 2
Using commodities as collateral - the case of Mobil
Producing Nigeria Unlimited
Mobil Producing Nigeria (MPN) holds a 40 per cent
interest in a joint venture with the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation engaged in the offshore
production of hydrocarbons.  For a new project, i.e. the
Oso Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) Project, it needed to
raise US$ 330 million.
Nigeria is unrated, and as the United States parent
company was unwilling to provide a guarantee on MPN’s
lending, MPN would normally not have been able to
borrow money at a rate better than that paid by the
Nigerian Government.  To overcome this problem, an
investment bank structured a so-called “asset-backed
securities issue”.  The future production of NGL and
crude oil of the project was sold to an international buyer,
who assigned the future proceeds of this sale to an
offshore trust.  This trust then issued “trust certificates”
that were sold to institutional investors, primarily in the
United States of America.  The issue was strongly
oversubscribed (over US$ 1 billion was offered), and the
interest rate paid by MPN on this 7-8 year loan (much
longer than normally would have been available for a
country like Nigeria) was 4 per cent lower than what it
otherwise could have expected to pay.
This improvement in credit rating (and thus in credit
conditions) is quite normal for collateralized finance.  In
dozens of cases, enterprises have been able to obtain
large credits on conditions better than those available for
their country.
international trade, which means that more
money is available at lower cost.  There are
several ways in which collateral can be used; the
most sophisticated involves the assignment of
commodities to an offshore “Special Purpose
Vehicle”, which then issues bonds for sale to
institutional investors.   Box 2 discusses one
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example of such a securitization, while box 3
gives a number of examples of these types of
financing and the resulting improvement in
credit rating (and thus financing costs).
B. Constraints
1. Lack of awareness and training
10. In developing countries and countries
with economies in transition, many of the
private entities now active on commodity
markets have only been involved in international
trade for a few years.  Their knowledge and
understanding of modern commodity marketing
and financing methods is thus limited.  The same
can be said of many local banks;  after years of
Government-determined loan policies, they
often do not have the skills or, generally, the
experience needed to provide their clients with
access to these modern financial markets.  Thus,
a major awareness-raising and training effort is
required.  Experience shows that, once they are
aware of the possibilities, many of the larger
companies access the markets rather fast.
11. In the case of parastatals, the problem is often a lack of awareness not on the part of parastatal
marketing or financial staff but on the part of their political masters.  Many of these companies are
technically ready to start a programme of risk management (which can still take over a year to implement),
but need proper political support.
2. Institutional weaknesses
12. Local banks are a natural intermediary for the use of modern financial instruments, in particular
now that so many new, relatively small actors have become directly involved in commodity trade.
Unfortunately, they are virtually absent from this area in most developing countries (with some notable
exceptions, such as the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank), thus severely
restricting the possibilities of  smaller enterprises in particular, including farmers’ associations.  Other
entities which could act as intermediaries, including farmers’ associations, are often also quite weak.TD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
page 5
  For a more complete overview of such laws and regulations hindering access to international credi t
3
markets, N. Budd, "Legal and regulatory aspects of financing c ommodity exporters and the provision of bank hedging
line credit in developing countries", UNCTAD/COM/56, 3 February 1995.  This paper also discusses how these laws
and regulations can be improved; for this see also M. Lubrano, "Strengthening the legal and institutional framework
for secured transactions in Latin America", BCSD Latin America World Bank Seminar, Miami, February 1995.
  Heywood Fleisig, "Secured transactions: the power of collateral",  Finance & Development, June 1996.
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Pemex Mexico BB A Oil
AHMSA Mexico BB BBB- Steel
Corpoven Venezuela B+ BBB Oil
Bitor Venezuela B+ BBB- Orimulsion
Alcoa do
Brasil
Brazil B BBB- Aluminium
Aracruz
Celulose
Brazil B BBB Pulp
Samarco Brazil B BBB- Iron ore














Indonesia BBB- A Gold
Source: based on conference presentations by  Paribas Capital
Markets and Credit Suisse First Boston.
S&P: Standard & Poor’s rating
*  Moody’s rating - similar to B+ in S& P’s rating structure
**  Moody’s rating - similar to BBB in S&P’s rating structure. 
3. Policy, legal and regulatory
framework
13. An inadequate legal and
regulatory framework is a major bottleneck
for improved use of modern financial
markets by enterprises.  Policies that
remove the incentives for risk management
and collateralized finance are also a
hindrance.  Problems include bans on the
use of risk management markets or policies
or practices that amount to bans (e.g. not
authorizing the use of overseas escrow
accounts or of foreign exchange to pay
margin calls); poor accounting standards;
minimum export price policies or
export/import taxation schemes that do not
recognize hedging; export licensing
schemes and other policies that restrict the
possibilities for overseas lenders to take
commodities as collateral;  direct
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interference in credit markets; an absence
or lack of implementation of proper rules
on bankruptcy proceedings; and a range of
restrictions on the kind of assets that can be
used as collateral (which effectively
discriminate against the poor).  Such
restrictions can be expensive; World Bank
research, for example, estimated the
welfare losses caused in Argentina and
Bolivia by barriers to secured
(collateralized) transactions at 5 to 10 per
cent of GNP.   
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4. Sovereign risks
14. When providing a risk management instrument or any form of finance to an entity in another
country, the provider takes a risk not only on the performance of the counterparty, but also on the country
where this counterparty is based.   For example, will the counterparty be able to obtain foreign currency
to meet his obligations?  Will the government agency directly or indirectly responsible for export policy
intervene in the counterparty’s right to export?  As it cannot be assumed that the same Government will
be in power during the life of the transaction, is there a risk that its successor will renege on the original
obligations?  This sovereign risk adds to the cost of risk management (or, for that matter, any form of
finance), and, unless mitigated by some form of guarantee, effectively excludes many entities fromTD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
page 6
  See also UNCTAD, "Counterpart and sovereign risk obstacles to improved access to risk managemen t
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markets: issues involved, problems and possible solutions”, TD/B/CN.1/GE.1/3, 2 August 1994.
Box 4
Overview of possible policy actions to improve
access to modern financial markets
IMPROVING SOVEREIGN RISK RATINGS
* Development of a proper warehousing system, including
the required legal and regulatory framework
* Creation of possibilities for insurance in convertible
currency
* Adaptation of commercial law to the exigencies of modern
commodity trade, in particular laws relating to security in
and title to goods and bankruptcy laws
* Broadening the system for the issuance of export licenses
* Reformulation of foreign exchange controls and minimum
export price regulations in such a way that legitimate
business transactions are no longer hindered
* Publicizing by the Government of its measures to stimulate
modern marketing and financing practices
INCREASING THE CAPACITY TO USE MORE FULLY
THE POSSIBILITIES FOR STRUCTURING
COMMODITY FINANCE
* Concerted actions to increase the awareness of structured
financing techniques among developing country
government policy-makers, producers, processors, traders
and banks, and to enhance their practical possibilities of
entering into structured financing transactions
* Promotion of the role of regional and domestic banks as
conduits for warehouse receipt financing
* Consideration of foreign locations for the storage of
commodities 
FACILITATING THE STRUCTURING OF
COMMODITY FINANCE THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL ACTION
* External financing of a warehousing infrastructure
* Creation of a "global warehousing" facility, with sovereign
risks covered by an international agency
* Strengthening of systems for the discounting of warehouse-
receipt finance-related letters of credit
* Promoting the standardization of physical trade contracts
* Enhancing the capacity for insuring the risks of warehouse-
receipt-related transactions
* Modification of the negative pledge policies of international
finance organizations
accessing the markets. Such guarantees
have a cost, and probably more
importantly, it can be very difficult to
arrange them, in particular for parastatals
and government departments which are
often constrained in their ability to
provide guarantees by the negative pledge
covenants contained in their loan
agreements with multilateral financial
institutions.   There are some possibilities
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of obtaining outside guarantees  - for
example, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development has
guaranteed risk management
programmes, and so has the International
Finance Corporation, while a number of
export credit agencies provide sovereign
risks insurance.   Box 4 describes a
number of policy actions that can help to
improve access to the financial markets
discussed in this paper.
C. Effectiveness
15. Are modern financial markets
effective in assisting enterprises to reach
their goals?  They normally bring the
goals nearer, but there are some inherent
limits to their use - limits that apply to
any user, not just to developing country
enterprises.
16. As commodity export earnings
or import costs are a function of both
volume and price, even with a price risk
management programme, one remains
exposed to quantity risks.  One is also
exposed to basis risk in reality, one will
not be locking in the export prices of the
country concerned, but rather a reference
price (e.g. the New York Mercantile
Exchange crude oil price).  As long as
one's export price moves fully in parallel with the international price, there is no problem, but if this
correlation is less than perfect (the "basis risk"), the impact of the risk management programme can be
disappointing.  For example, if  international prices remain stable while one's export prices fall by 10 per
cent, even with a price risk management programme in place, there would be no compensation for the
lower export prices.  Accordingly, one of the preconditions for an effective risk management programme
is that there is a liquid international risk management market which trades products whose price is well
correlated with the prices of the products in which one is interested.  In practice, this implies that, for theTD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
page 7
Even though many importers buy these products at subsidized prices wh ich may be barely correlated
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to world market prices, use of futures market can still be very useful - importers can put on a hedge when worl d
market prices are favourable and issue a tender when attractive export subsidies are available.  See FAO, “Using risk
management in grain trade: implications for developing countries”, Rome, CCP:GR 95/4, 1995.
large majority of exporters of coffee, cocoa, oil, copper and a range of other products and for importers of,
for example, wheat, vegetable oils and sugar,  there are good possibilities for price risk management.  For
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other products, in particular cotton, plywood and livestock, even though there are futures markets, they are
hardly representative for the world as a whole.  And for a number of important commodities, such as fish
and iron ore, there is no futures market at all.
17. However, before concluding that this means that the use of these markets is not effective, one
should examine the alternatives.  Not using these markets means a continuing exposure to price risks for
the full volume of production.  Absolute price risks are generally much larger than the basis risks one
assumes when using futures markets; in other words, using futures markets means that the likelihood of
losing significant sums of money due to unfavourable price movements is much smaller and eventual losses
are thus more easily manageable (when using futures contracts for risk management, the likelihood of
gaining significant sums of money is also much lower, but as noted before, the whole purpose of risk
management is to reduce risk, not to speculate on future price movements).
18. The time horizon for price risk management is also limited.  This horizon has moved further away
in recent years, and risk management markets for some commodities (crude oil, gold, aluminium, copper)
are now reasonably liquid for more than five years out into the future.  For soft commodities such as sugar,
coffee and cocoa, however, it is generally difficult to put an effective risk management programme in place
for periods much longer than two years, especially if one wishes to build in option elements.  For annual
crops such as wheat, the period is even shorter.  So, while use of risk management markets is effective for
ensuring annual budgets, it is not necessarily so for longer-term planning or investment periods.
Nevertheless, having a risk management programme in place provides extra time for adaptation to changing
market conditions.
19. The ultimate goals of price risk management are twofold: to increase flexibility in such a way that
marketing can be improved and to ensure that the company always has enough cashflow to enable
profitable ventures to be undertaken without unduly high financing costs.  Depending on a company’s cash
flow situation and the size of relevant transactions, the use of price risk management and collateralized
finance markets is not always the most effective way to reach these goals.  If a company does not need this
tool to improve its marketing, or if it is very rich in cash (or has very easy access to capital markets), then
the use of price risk management markets can be a waste of resources.  In practice, few companies fall in
this category; most of the Fortune-1,000 companies, for example, use price risk management markets.
20. As to the effectiveness of collateralized financing, this normally brings lower interest rates but
higher transaction costs than with unsecured credits.  If the deal is small, or the company has a good track
record and thus easy access to finance, the interest rate savings resulting from the use of collateral may be
less than the extra transaction costs.  In particular, if local banks are unable to arrange collateral finance,
this can lock small enterprises out of the market.  Nevertheless, collateral finance is making progress - for




An example of the use of options for price
protection by a farmers’ association
On behalf of its members, a farmers’ association wishes
to buy agricultural inputs.  However, the bank that it
approaches for credit notes that the capacity to
reimburse of the association (which also undertakes
coffee marketing on behalf of its members) depends
strongly on the prices that it will receive at the time the
loan needs to be reimbursed.  Coffee price volatility is
such that, without risk management, their is a real
danger that the needed minimum income will not be
reached.  Some international price ranges for arabica
coffee in recent years are as follows:
1994: between 80 and 220 cts/lb
1995: between 110 and 180 cts/lb
1996: between 110 and 130 cts/lb
1997: between 130 and 270 cts/lb. 
It would thus seem sound for the bank to protect the
association’s income through a risk management
programme.  Using forward contracts or futures is out
of the question: if prices increase and the association is
locked into a fixed price, farmers are likely to default
on their delivery obligations to the association and
deliver to traders instead.  The bank therefore decides
to include in the financing package a series of options
which protect the association if prices fall but still
allow it to benefit from price increases.  Of course, the
options have a cost, but without this, the association
would possibly not have been able to obtain the input
credit, and its members would not have had a
guaranteed minimum price for their future production.
Chapter II
THE IMPORTANCE OF PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT AND ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE
CREDIT FOR FARMERS
A. Experiences
21. Governments in most countries have reduced their role in the agricultural sector in recent years,
or are in the process of doing so.  The impact on farmers has been twofold.  Firstly, they are being exposed
to price risks that previously were absorbed by the Government - gradually so in countries such as the
United States of America, where the 1996 “Freedom to Farm” Act foresees a seven-year transition period,
and from one year to the next in most developing countries and countries in transition.  Secondly, with the
withdrawal of Governments and the fragmentation of marketing systems, credit systems have often
collapsed, negatively affecting productivity (as input supply was interrupted) and forcing farmers to sell
their product directly after harvest (which reduces the prices they receive and distorts seasonal price
behaviour).
22. Using price risk management
instruments can be difficult (see box 5 for an
example of such use).  Transaction costs are
such that the use of market-based risk
management instruments only makes sense when
done through a farmers’ association.  These
associations need not only access to information
about these instruments and the markets on
which they are traded (which are often abroad)
but also access to their trading facilities.  There
are then a whole range of constraints, ranging
from the need to recruit appropriate staff to
finding a willing intermediary and meeting the
credit requirements of the market.  Nevertheless,
a number of farmers’ associations in various
countries have overcome these constraints and
are actively providing their members with price
protection through the use of futures and options
markets (e.g. for coffee in Costa Rica and cotton
in Uganda).  Competition between traders also
helps farmers to benefit from the existence of
risk management markets.
23. If a Government is willing to undertake
the necessary policy actions, the problems in the
credit system are relatively easy to reduce and
indeed are on the way to being considerably
reduced in a number of countries.  Farmers are
in theory good clients for credit institutions: in
order to function efficiently, they need
continuing access to credit (giving them an
incentive to reimburse their loans in time), and
the crops they produce or their livestock are good collateral for loans.  What is needed is a system that
allows banks to benefit from these relative strengths.
24. The key factor in this regard is the development of techniques to secure loan reimbursement.TD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
page 9
  It is, of course, most effective when most traders in a region agree to participate in the scheme, because
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it will then be difficult for farmers to sell to non-participating traders.  It can be difficult to meet this condition; also,
banks may be unwilling to accept traders as viable credit counterparties.  Commodity exchanges, where they exist,
can play a role similar to that of traders, in particular if farmers have strong incentives to sell through the exchange
(this is why, for example, several developing country flower producers obtain low-cost credit: their flowers are sold
through the Aalsmeer auction in the Netherlands, and there are few good alternatives to this outlet).
  There are other forms, and it is national legal and regulatory conditions that determine which commodities
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are acceptable collateral, and under what modalities.  For example, a recent World Bank report states: "In Uruguay,
no private bank would accept cattle as collateral for a loan.  By contrast, in Kansas, cattle are considered to be the
best collateral for a loan." (Heywood Fleisig, op.cit.)  In virtually all developing countries, the situation is rather like
in Uruguay, cutting off a significant segment of the population from access to low-cost credit.
  These issues are discussed in UNCTAD, “Integrated risk management in commodities” ,
9
UNCTAD/ITCD/COM/8, 26 November 1997.
Box 6
The benefits of warehouse receipt finance - an
example for coffee in Kenya
Banks are willing to provide more credit on better
terms if borrowers are willing to provide collateral and
in the case of commodity finance, the commodities
themselves are good collateral.  Managing collateral
brings additional costs, but these costs are more than
offset by lower borrowing costs.  The following is an




Value of goods US$ 7 mln. US$ 7 mln.
Advance rate 50 % 80%
Loan proceeds US$ 3.5 mln. US$ 5.6 mln.
Interest rate 21.0 % 8.5 %
Interest cost  US$ 184,000 US$ 119,000
Storage and
insurance costs US$ 120,000 US$ 179,000
Total costs US$ 304,000 US$ 298,000
The borrower using his commodities as collateral
pays slightly lower charges on a 60 per cent higher
loan.
Source: “Managing your collateral risk in Africa”,
presentation by R.P.G. Taylor, Manager, SGS Kenya
Ltd., at the First African Oil Trade Conference,
Harare, 15-17 April 1996. 
Simplifying somewhat, there are two ways to do this.
One is to gain some form of control over the
payment for commodities - that is, if the
commodities are indeed delivered, the buyer (e.g.  a
trader or a commodity exchange arranging farmers'
sales) pays to a bank which has been providing inputs
on credit to farmers; the bank then pays the farmers
after deducting what is due on the credit.  This
system, or a slightly more sophisticated version of it,
is used in several countries in Central and Eastern
Europe and Central America and, for example, in
Zambia.   A second solution which is often applied
7
successfully is that of using the commodities
themselves, rather than the anticipated payments for
them, as collateral, and  the most prevalent form of
this is warehouse receipt finance (see box 6 for an
example).
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25. In warehouse receipt finance, banks (or
others) provide credit on the basis of goods which are
stored in a (preferably) independently controlled
warehouse.  The default risk is shifted from the
borrower to the warehousing company - often a large
entity backed by financial guarantees and using
insurance for further protection.
26. In many countries with economies in
transition, including the Russian Federation, Poland,
Hungary and Romania, warehouse receipt finance is being developed as a way to improve access to credit
for small and medium-sized grain producers (with the added advantage that product quality is tested and
improved).   In most developing countries, the focus is more on credits for producers of export crops (e.g.
9
coffee in Uganda, pepper in Malaysia, sugar in Argentina), although in a number of countries (India,
Philippines, Mali and Zambia, for example), use of grains and other local foodcrops as collateral for credits
to farmers is also being developed.  The main obstacles are poor legal and regulatory frameworks, as
already discussed in chapter I, and organizational weaknesses at the level of farmers’ organizations.
B. Possibilities for overcoming constraints
27. Farmers are generally the last group to benefit from the possibilities offered by modern financialTD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
page 10
 These issues are discussed at greater length in UNCTAD, “Government policies affecting the use o f
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commodity price risk management and access to commodity finance in developing countries” ,
UNCTAD/ITCD/COM/7, 19 November 1997.  This chapter concentrates on price risk management rather tha n
collateral finance; while tying commodity prices to debt service may help to gain better credit terms and parastatals
can use commodities as collateral for finance in various ways, commodity price risk exposure is an immediate and
often large problem for Governments.
markets.  They are often not even aware of these possibilities;  in many instances, they just use the price
information generated by commodity exchanges to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis traders, often
quite successfully. Also, they are generally not sufficiently well organized to use them even if they are
aware of them; this again underlines the need for promoting strong farmers’ associations.  Unfortunately,
even if strong farmers’ associations exist, in many if not most countries they may well be confronted with
a poor institutional framework, in particular, local banks do not have the expertise needed to intermediate
in risk management or provide credits secured by future production or warehouse receipts.  This may be
a reason for the Government to set up an intermediating agency, or to stimulate banks to learn about
intermediating in risk management or using commodities as collateral (a process to which the international
community could contribute).
28. If the risk management and financing needs of farmers are dealt with by an association, the
likelihood of them gaining access to modern markets is much larger, firstly because such an association
can afford to invest in training and information gathering, secondly because the transaction costs of the
bank will be much lower than when dealing with many small farmers on an individual basis and thirdly
because there is some form of mutual guarantee by the association's members.
29. Currently, only a few farmers' associations in developing countries and countries in transition are
strong enough to engage successfully in marketing or credit provision.  These associations are ready to
learn about more sophisticated applications.  Although small, the number of such associations is likely to
increase rapidly in the years to come.  In addition, many organizations, including different parts of the
United Nations system, are working on upgrading the skill levels of such associations.  It should be realized
that, only a few years ago, there were no independent farmers' associations in many countries.
C. Effectiveness
30. The use of price risk management instruments and warehouse receipt finance can be effective
ways for farmers’ associations to reach goals such as guaranteeing a minimum price to their members;
improving longer-term marketing; or ensuring an affordable credit programme linked, for example, to input
supply.  The use of warehouse receipts (the main means of using commodities as collateral relevant for
farmers), as seen in box 6 above, improves credit availability while reducing its cost.  In practice, banks
which have a proper understanding of agricultural finance are also willing to extend the length of their
credits to periods of several months before harvests will take place, as long as at harvest the produce is
immediately put into supervised warehouses.  Price risk management by farmers is likely to be less
effective than price risk management by enterprises: the basis risk discussed in the previous chapter is
likely to be higher for farmers’ associations than for those closer to the act of exporting.  The decision to
use price risk management instruments therefore requires a careful analysis of the relationships between
farmgate prices and futures exchange prices.
Chapter III
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PRICE RISK EXPOSURE
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31. In many countries, Governments are engaged in commodity trade (e.g. through parastatals).
Parastatals may contribute to or act as a burden on government budgets, depending on price levels.  This
is the case not just for parastatals directly involved in commodity trade, but also for public transport
companies (including airlines) which, when oil prices increase, cannot easily increase transport fares.  TD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
page 11
  The effects of commodity booms are not discussed in this paper.  Various factors, including the possible
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crowding-out of non-traditional exports as a result of the currency  appreciation caused by high earnings for one export
commodity, and over-optimistic investment plans decided on during times of high commodity prices, mean that the
effects of such booms are not necessarily positive.  See UNCTAD, “Sub-Saharan Africa’s oil sector: situation ,
development and prospects”, UNCTAD/COM/89, 13 March 1997, chapter II, and UNCTAD/ITCD/COM/7, chapter
IV.
  See P. Varangis, T. Akiyama and D. Mitchell, Managing Commodity Booms - and Busts, World Bank,
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Washington, D.C., 1995.
Furthermore, in many countries which depend on commodities for their export earnings, a considerable part
of government income derives from a tax on exports (or similar charges such as royalties) which is fixed
in percentage terms - in other words, if commodity prices decline, tax income declines concomitantly.  If
commodity export prices are low and Governments are unable to compensate tax or royalty income
shortfalls by larger international lending (and it is generally more difficult to obtain funds on good terms
when export earnings prospects are worse), the likely result is that it will not be possible to implement the
planned expenditure programme.   Salaries are then paid late, necessary maintenance on roads, ports and
other public infrastructure is delayed and public construction projects and the like are temporarily halted -
all with real costs for the economy.  Also, in many countries,  bulk commodities (crude oil and oil products,
wheat, sugar, vegetable oils) account for a large share of imports, and the tax income from these imports
is inversely related to price levels: if world market prices increase, Governments tend to decrease import
taxes on these strategic commodities in order to protect consumers.  The management of these types of
direct risks is discussed in section A below.
32. In addition to this, many Governments also have indirect exposure.  The health of the economy
as a whole may depend on the prices that private-sector actors pay or receive for commodities.
Furthermore, the competitiveness of the country may hinge on its transaction costs in international trade,
which are to a large extent determined by financing costs and commodity prices (including transport costs).
One way for Governments to reduce the risks related to this indirect exposure is by stimulating the
emergence of a legal and regulatory framework which enables private-sector actors to manage price risks
(and access collateralized finance markets), as discussed in the previous chapters.  This, and some other
short-term measures Governments may take, is discussed in section B below.
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A. Direct government exposure to price risks, and ways to mitigate these risks
33. There are various ways for Governments to mitigate their commodity price risk exposure, namely
by promoting diversification; using variable export taxes; using commodity boom bonds (bought
obligatorily  for hard currency by exporters); privatization, which shifts risks to the private sector; using
contingent borrowing for example through the International Monetary Fund’s Compensatory and
Contingency Financing Facility; liberalizing financial markets to allow easier access to international funds;
and using market-based risk management.   Market-based methods have the advantage that major risks
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are externalized to a large and liquid market (generally abroad) with a definite appetite for risk - in other
words, a market where risk management can be found relatively cheaply.  Governments can consider the
following modalities for such market-based risk management:
  (a) Using "hybrid" stabilization funds or policies; the Government itself absorbs small risks,
but larger risks are shifted to the market;
(b) Making debt service dependent on commodity price levels;
(c) Using the futures and over-the-counter risk management markets for "strategic" risk
management (locking in favourable price levels for extended periods).
1. Hybrid stabilization funds and policies
34. Traditional price stabilization funds have a poor track record.  When the need arises to draw on
the fund to compensate for low prices, the money is often not there - either because insufficient provision
has been made or because funds have been spent already for other purposes.  The behaviour of commodityTD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
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prices, makes this type of outcome almost unavoidable.  In order to play an effective role over the course
of a business cycle, a price stabilization fund has to be so large that, in a capital-constrained economy, it
is highly likely that a better use can be found for the funds.
35. Hybrid stabilization funds reduce (but do not eliminate) this problem.  In an ideal world, they
would be second-best solutions, since externalizing all risks to international risk management markets can
be shown to be lower-cost.  However, in practice, the possibilities for countries to externalize risks are
often limited, or come at a high cost.  In such cases, and if the Government still wishes to insulate its
country’s population from the full effect of world market price volatility, it can operate a small stabilization
fund, while simultaneously buying options as protection against large price movements.  Currently, this
hybrid strategy is not used anywhere, although it has been studied for a few countries.  A World Bank study
on Venezuela, for example, found that an oil stabilization fund could be usefully complemented by the use
of market-based risk management;  a simulation showed that, given certain objectives, the size of the
stabilization fund needed is much smaller and the cost of using market instruments is much less than in the
case of holding larger assets in the fund.  Moreover, the need for international borrowing to allow the
survival of the fund could be eliminated.
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2. Commodity-price-dependent debt
36. If a Government depends strongly on earnings from commodities for its income,  its ability to
service its debt evidently depends directly on the level of world market prices for these commodities.  In
such a case, it makes sense to link the two directly by, for example, making interest rates a function of oil
or cocoa prices.  This immediately reduces the default risk on loans (if export earnings are lower or import
costs higher, debt service will also be much lower, so it will be relatively easy for the country to avoid a
default) and thus is likely to lead to a smaller risk premium (in other words, a lower borrowing cost).
37. Some Governments have indeed used this mechanism, starting in the last century, when the
Government of the then Confederate States of America found it could raise money much more effectively
by tying reimbursement to cotton prices.   The most recent burst of activity started at the end of the 1980s
in the context of the renegotiation of existing debts.   This resulted in so-called "Brady bonds" in which the
interest rate is tied to commodity prices (for example, in the case of Uruguay, to import prices of petroleum
products and export prices of beef, wool and rice).  However, Governments have been much less active
in issuing commodity-price-linked bonds than corporate borrowers.   Lack of awareness of existing
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possibilities certainly plays a role, but in practice lack of coordination between government entities ("turf
wars") is often the major bottleneck.
3. Using futures and over-the-counter risk management markets
38. Use of risk management markets has become accepted as sound practice by most central banks,
but they tend to limit themselves to the use of interest rate and currency swaps and options, although often
the risks of commodity price fluctuations are more important for the country than those from currency or
interest rate fluctuations.  There have been some examples of central banks and ministries of finance taking
out protection against commodity price risks, principally in Latin America, and to cover the price risks
linked to oil exports or imports. For example, Mexico's Ministry of Finance has successfully used futures,
options and swap markets to protect the Government against the risk of declining taxation earnings on
petroleum exports.  Use of commodity price risk management instruments by government entities is more
widespread in developed countries, in particular in the United States of America (see box 7).  There appearTD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
page 13
  UNCTAD, “New types of non-trade-related participation in commodity futures markets” ,
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Box 7
Oil price risk management in 
United States public entities
Although still in a minority, a number of United States
public entities are actively using market-based risk
management instruments to manage their exposure to
oil price risks.  In an evaluation of the reasons for and
effectiveness of this risk management, it was found that
the reasons varied:
Protection of state revenues from oil and gas
production;
Protection of the budget for regular purchases
of oil products;
Protection of the budget for subsidizing fuel
consumption by low-income households;
Avoiding the need for large (energy or public
transport) price increases for consumers;
Protection of the value of inventories; and
Taking advantage of favourable pricing
situations.
In most cases, public entities use over-the-counter
instruments rather than exchange-traded futures and
options, because they find these are easier to
administer, require less technical understanding than
exchange-traded instruments, require few resources
once the strategy is put in place, and do not require
many administrative controls to prevent loss of public
funds.  Although the effectiveness of the use of these
instruments has often been reduced by the bureaucratic
procedures that agencies are forced to follow, overall
agencies have found that the use of these instruments
meets their objectives (and if not, it was generally
concluded that changing the specific market-based
instruments being used would make it possible to meet
their objectives) and is beneficial to them.
Source: Decision Analysis Corporation of Virginia,
Management of fuel price risk in the public sector,
prepared for the Energy Information Administration,
Department of Energy, United States of America, 1993.
to be no cases of African governments, which are
highly exposed to commodity price fluctuations,
protecting themselves against these risks.
Possibilities abound (see box 8 for one example),
but the unfamiliarity of most government policy-
makers with these relatively new instruments, and
other obstacles, have so far prevented most
countries from benefiting from them.
4. Obstacles
39. Governments have, so far, not been very
active on these various markets.  They have
tended to absorb price risks themselves or  shifted
them to their citizens.  Generally by default rather
than by choice, they have tended to forego the
possibility of locking favourable price levels for
extended periods.  How does one explain this
relative lack of use of risk management markets?
The main constraints are described below.
(i) Mistrust, fear, inertia and lack of
awareness/understanding
40. Risk management markets are often seen
as speculative or, worse, manipulated by large
international players.  It is then concluded that it is
more risky for Governments to use these markets
than to simply continue absorbing risks.  There is
little ground for this fear: manipulation is, in
practice, rather difficult (most would-be
manipulators end up with large losses), and
speculation, while exacerbating short-term price
movements, has little effect on longer-term price
levels.   If commodity trade is relatively well
15
managed and the grades of commodities traded by
the country conform more or less to the standard
grades traded internationally, the prices quoted on risk management markets will provide a good proxy for
the prices to be received or paid by the country and thus can be used effectively for risk management.
41. For those holding political or practical responsibility for earnings (or expenditures) related to
commodity price levels, it is often much easier to blame shortfalls on negative price developments than to
explain why risk management should be put in place.  Price risk management is, in many respects, similar
to insurance: if nothing bad happens, the insurance does not pay out.  For those who do not understand this
principle, it is very easy to conclude that the insurance premium has been wasted and that the government
officials who took the decision to put this insurance in place were incompetent or even corrupt.  Indeed,
in a number of countries, government officials have been accused of this, either by parts of public opinion
or by other  branches  of the Government.  In such a climate,   inertia  is the safest solution and until
Government Arabica forward price curves of














































  A precedent was set in the United States in 1992, when a court found that the directors of a grain farmers’
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cooperative had a duty to understand risk management techniques and had “breached their duties by retaining  a
manager inexperienced in hedging (...) and failing to attain knowledg e of the basic fundamentals of hedging...” (Brane
v. Roth, Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District, 20 April 1992,  North Eastern Reporter, 2  Series).
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Using risk management as a strategic tool - the example of coffee in Africa
From time to time, commodity market prices reach levels that, for either buyers or sellers, seem too good to be
true.  Of course, when prices are climbing rapidly, or falling precipitously, one cannot be sure on any one day
whether  this price move will continue.   However, if prices stay at the same level, they may be good enough  for
example, to ensure the profitability of an investment project or government income higher than necessary to meet
its budget.  If so, then foregoing the opportunity to lock in this price in the hope that tomorrow’s price will be
even better amounts to speculation (today’s financial markets offer the possibility to lock  in a minimum price
while still being able to benefit partly from price increases without the payment of any premiums).  
A strategic decision to lock these prices in for a longer period can be a very sound one.  For an example of how
useful this type of strategic risk management can
be, the case of coffee in Africa is examined here.
Of course, this is a hypothetical case - in 1994,
African Governments were, on the whole, not
ready to make strategic price risk management
decisions (the instruments for this had only been
in existence for a few years).
After years of depression, coffee prices started
rising rapidly in May 1994.  Arabica and robusta
prices went respectively from 90 cents/lb  and 70
cts/lb in April to 2.20 US$/lb and 1.60 US$/lb in
July and stayed very high for four months,
reaching a peak in September before starting to
fall quite rapidly.  In the opinion of most market players, (at the time and not just with hindsight), price levels
were highly attractive.  These high prices could realistically have been locked in: as the graph above shows, the
forward price curve for coffee was more or less flat.  The market was
also deep enough to absorb considerable hedging activity, since in 1994
futures and options turnovers equaled respectively 20 and 7 times the
size of the world arabica and robusta coffee market.
The table shows the additional earnings that could have been possible
had African coffee exporters been able to lock in, for two years (1995-
1996), the high prices of 1994 - adding up to US$ 1.4 billion if
exporters’ risk management decisions had been  equally spaced over the
four last months of that year.  Even if the hedge had only been put i n
place in December, when prices had already fallen by more than one
quarter since September, additional coffee export revenues of  US$ 700
million would have resulted.
Unfortunately, this opportunity could not be taken advantage of.  The
necessary decision-making structures were not in place, and indeed no
support to develop the necessary thinking and institution-building had
been given by either Western banks (most considered that African
countries were not ready for this kind of business, although at least one
Government was approached with an offer to lock in coffee prices) or
multilateral organizations.
officials are held accountable for the consequences of negative price changes, this is unlikely to change.
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42. Fear of markets is often compounded by a fear on the part of senior government officials that their
staff, who would be responsible on a day-to-day basis, cannot be trusted to use markets properly.  This is
not completely unfounded (there have been some clear abuses) but should not apply to the use of all
instruments; for example, a swap, strategically placed from time to time to ensure the budget can be met,
can be decided on by senior decision-makers themselves, using any of a number of low-cost methods to
ensure that the price offered is fair.  In contrast, using futures and options markets on a regular basis is
much more risky and requires a stringent  control environment;  if conditions are not suitable for such
stringent controls, one should refrain from using this group of instruments.
(ii) Legal and regulatory constraints
43. Many government bodies and parastatals do not have the clear legal authority to enter into risk
management transactions, either because their scope of activities is enumerated in their statutes and risk
management is not mentioned or because of general policies or regulations banning such entities from
"speculation" without properly defining the difference between speculation and risk management.  The
inability of some state entities (e.g. municipal authorities) to hold accounts in other countries  also makes
risk management rather difficult.
44. Even if, strictly speaking, there are no such legal or regulatory constraints, ambiguity on the legal
and regulatory status of public bodies’ use of modern financial markets acts as an obstacle.  Foreign entities
are often not willing to spend the legal fees needed to ensure that they can enforce compliance will the
contract and indeed are generally not willing to accept even small risks that contracts might not be legally
enforceable (some US$179 million were lost by banks in the late 1980s when over 100 United Kingdom
municipalities defaulted on risk management contracts and successfully claimed that, as they did not have
the authority to enter into these contracts in the first place, the contracts should be considered void).
(iii) Organizational complexity
45. Designing an appropriate risk management programme is often not easy, partly because of
organizational problems.  If any one department (e.g. the Ministry of Finance, or the Ministry of
Agriculture) considers it useful to take out price insurance (using options or more complex risk
management instruments), it probably needs Cabinet approval and, in addition,  a foreign exchange
allocation from the Central Bank - which may not approve of this use of its scarce hard currency.  Also,
for most types of risk management deals and collateralized finance,  some form of financial guarantee
needs to be given to the providers.  The Central Bank, for example, may provide part of its gold reserves
as collateral, or the government parastatal active in coffee marketing may assign two months of its earnings
to an escrow account.  In any case, various groups are involved, and it may be prohibitively difficult to get
everyone to agree.
46. This sort of difficulty is even greater when a Government wishes to lock in exceptionally
favourable prices - the form of strategic risk management discussed in box 8.  Most commodity prices do
not really move cyclically but are relatively flat for long periods and then peak for a relatively short time.
Especially for exports, the “window of opportunity” for locking in a high price is therefore fairly short and
the whole decision-making machinery needs to be put in place well in advance in other words at a time
when prices are not very attractive and policy-makers thus have little incentive to think about the possibility
of locking in prices for a prolonged period.  If the necessary mechanisms are not put in place in time, by
the time everyone involved understands what is at stake and what needs to be done, the opportunity has
probably passed.  In other words, Governments should already plan for this contingency and decide on a
clear policy and procedure to be triggered automatically when prices reach certain highly favourable levels.
B. Indirect risk
47. Even if the major part of commodity  trade is in the hands of the private sector and direct
government taxation on commodity trade flows is of limited importance, Governments remain exposed toTD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
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commodity price instability in newly liberalized economies”, Economic a nd Social Research Council, London, Global
Economic Institutions, April 1996.
price risks through the general effects that these risks have on their countries’ population.  The role of
Governments in risk management is therefore no less important than if it were directly exposed; it is just
different. The Government needs to create the framework which allows the private sector to protect itself
from price fluctuations, and indirectly this would also protect the Government. 
48. The price risks to which private sector actors are exposed are not necessarily identical to the
country's price risks.  For example, agents of foreign commodity buyers work on a commission and the
prevailing prices of the moment are hardly relevant to them.  Importers who buy at world market prices
and sell to consumers for this price plus a mark-up are also only interested in their relative margin, not in
the absolute prices.  The result is that the burden of price volatility is borne by the farmers and the
consumers respectively, both groups being in a much worse position than traders for managing exposure
to price risks.
49. Government policies can be used to stimulate private entities to be more proactive in managing
longer-term price risks.  For example, taxation policies can be improved, the use of foreign exchange for
risk management programmes can be authorized and export procedures can be adapted in such a way that
the timing of commodity exports becomes more certain (and hedging thus becomes easier).  Governments
can also undertake risk management “on behalf” of their country’s private sector actors.  If import prices
are low, Governments can buy options and make importers pay through slightly higher import taxes and
if prices increase, consumers  can be compensated through lower taxes.  Similarly, Governments can buy
options "on behalf" of exporters to protect them against the risk of price declines.  If necessary,
Governments can themselves provide certain facilities for a limited period - as has been done, for example,




50. Can modern risk management and finance markets be effective tools for bringing government
goals nearer?  As already discussed in chapter I, the effectiveness of price risk management markets is
never 100 per cent; they can only be used to manage international price risks (which are not necessarily
well correlated will the export or import price risks to which the Government is exposed), and the risk of
fluctuations in export or import volumes remains.  Another important factor is how realistic government
goals are.  If the goal is to ensure a local minimum price for an export commodity that is much higher than
that prevailing on the world market, then no amount of financial engineering will allow the Government
to reach this goal without paying a major subsidy (though, financial markets will allow the Government
to ensure that the amount budgeted for its subsidies is sufficient even if world market prices fall).
Similarly, the use of commodity-linked debt by developing countries will reduce the Government’s
financing charges, but not to the level paid by the most creditworthy borrowers.  However, if the goal is
realistic (for example, ensuring for the coming two years a minimum price somewhat below current price
levels, or reducing international borrowing costs to slightly above LIBOR), it is likely that it will be brought
nearer, even though it is still unlikely to be reached in a perfect manner.
IV.  CONCLUSION
51. As a result of developments in world commodity trade (such as better information availability,
the increasing importance of good logistics, and increasing competition between exporters) and the
withdrawal of many Governments from the marketing and pricing of commodities, the use of market-based
risk management instruments and collateral financing techniques has grown increasingly useful, perhapsTD/B/COM.1/EM.5/2
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even crucial: for Governments, because they make it possible to secure budgets and reduce international
borrowing costs; for enterprises, because they improve efficiency, reduce costs, and allow better access to
finance, thus improving profitability; for farmers, because it enlarges their marketing options and facilitates
their access to the credit they require to buy inputs.  The use of such instruments is also effective: as long
as goals are set realistically (that is, reflect the realities of the market), using the instruments will bring
these goals much nearer, although one should not expect perfect results.  Alternative tools to reach these
goals are at times (but not always) available, but they tend to be more expensive and less effective.
52. However, use of these market-based instruments has been constrained by a number of factors.
In all cases, there is a large need for awareness-raising and training.  The use of price risk management
instruments and warehouse receipt finance has also been restricted by a poor institutional environment, with
weak local banking structures and underdeveloped farmers’ associations.  Furthermore, there is much room
for the improvement of policy, legal and regulatory frameworks.
53. These policy, legal and regulatory issues play an even larger role in constraining the use of
commodities to facilitate longer-term finance for large companies or projects.   The use of commodities
as collateral, in one form or another, can do much to allow trade and investment which otherwise would
not have been possible.  A lack of awareness and understanding does play some role, but inappropriate
government policies, rules and regulations also play a role.   The international community also imposes
some obstacles, particularly through the negative pledge covenants imposed by multilateral development
banks.  
54. It should be clear that modern, market-based financial tools are not a panacea and that, if
improperly applied, they can be dangerous.  Especially for complex deals, there is often an information
imbalance: the fair costs of structuring the financing, or of the risk management instrument, are only known
to the provider.  Nevertheless, assistance can be found by those who feel they do not have the specialized
skills to evaluate such complex financial deals.  Furthermore, if an inappropriate strategy is chosen (that
is, a strategy that is more complex than the entity can handle), the risks of using risk management markets
can be large. The purchase of options and the strategic use of swaps (in particular, if options are embedded)
involves little risk, as long as decision-makers have ensured that the pricing is fair.  However, using futures
and over-the-counter risk management markets in a more active manner does require a good and relatively
sophisticated control environment; information on how to set this up is widely available, but the necessary
conditions may not exist in all cases, and if so, entities may be better off refraining from such use until
these conditions have been built up.
55. If the use of modern market-based price risk management and financing tools is to the benefit of
private-sector actors, Governments need to ensure that the policy, legal and regulatory framework in place
stimulates the proper use of these tools.  This would imply, in many cases, a systematic revision of policies
in a range of areas: taxation, accountancy rules, foreign exchange regulations, bankruptcy rules and
proceedings, export licensing systems, etc.  One of the consequences of such a revision (if acted upon)
would be an improvement of the country’s sovereign risk rating, with an immediate beneficial effect on
the availability and costs of finance.   If it is felt that the private-sector institutional framework is so weak
that it cannot be relied upon to provide private corporations and farmers’ associations with access to these
modern tools, a Government can consider playing this intermediary role itself.
56. Governments may also benefit from analyzing their exposure to commodity price risks, both
directly and indirectly.  Such an analysis could be done in a systematic manner through a risk management
committee consisting of several ministries and the central bank.  In many cases, the risks that are,
voluntarily or by necessity, borne by the Government can be externalized to a foreign market at a relatively
low cost.   The risks that come with strong dependence on commodities for a major part of export earnings
represent a weakness, but this weakness can be converted into a strength if the Government ties it debt
obligations to commodity prices.  For parastatals, the use of modern commodity financing techniques can
often be a good way to reduce  financing costs. 
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57. As noted,  there are still many constraints which prevent the private sector as well as government
bodies and entities from adopting effective price risk management and financing strategies.  A coordinated
effort of national Governments and the international community will be necessary to overcome these
constraints.  Of course, this poses questions for international commodity policies.  Traditionally, such
policies were supply- or demand-oriented.  It can be argued that, nowadays, transaction-oriented policies
focusing on the part of the commodity chain between production and consumption can be at least as
effective.  National bodies and international agencies (including international commodity bodies) might
find it useful to review their policies and projects in this light.  Apart from the provision of analysis,
information and training, international agencies may consider it useful to intensify their efforts to
strengthen the capacity of farmers’ associations and local banks to play an active role in commodity
marketing and finance.   Support for the improvement of legal and regulatory frameworks can also be a
very cost-effective way of reducing the commodity trade transaction costs of actors in developing countries
and countries with economies in transition.  International organizations could also consider whether, instead
of the traditional “financing” type of development assistance, it would not be more effective to provide
support to private-sector operations in one way or another (including through the provision of new
sovereign risk guarantee schemes for risk management transactions or to insure against the risk of non-
delivery of physical commodities which have served as the collateral for financing or risk management
facilities).
18